Belief consolidation schemes in AI can be viewed as three dimensional languages, consisting of a syntax (e.g. probabilities or certainty Factors), a calculus (e.g. Bayesian rules or CF combination rules), and a semantics (i.e. cognitive interpretations of competing formalisms). This paper studies the underlying rationality of those languages on the syntax and calculus grounds.
In particular, the paper presents the CF-Bayesian Endomorphism Theorem, which explicitly defines the class of real-life problems of expertise that have a rational CF interpretation. Some implications of the theorem to the relationship between the CF and the Bayesian languages and the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence are presented. Finally, the paper discusses the implications of the theorem on the science and practice of rule-based knowledge engineering.
INTRODIJCTION
In order for a computer program to be a plausible �odel of a (mora or less) rational process of human expertise, the program should be capable of repres enting beliefs in a language that is (more or less) calibrated with a well-specified normative criterion, e.g. the axioms of Subjective Probability [15] , the Theory of Confir.nation [4] , formal Logic, etc. According to Shafer & Tversky, the building blocks· of a probabilistic language are syntax, calculus, and semantics [18] . The� is a set of numbers, co�only referred to as Degrees of Belief (e.g. standard probabilities or Certainty Factors), which are used to parameterize uncertain facts, inexact rules, and competing hypotheses.
Typically, a set of atomic Degrees of Belief (COB's) is elicited directly from a human expert, while compound COB's are compu ted through a set of operators collectively known as a �elief calculus.
Finally, the semaptics of the language can be viewed as a mapping from a real-life domain of expertise onto the probabilistic language. Th!s mapping provides a cognitive interpretation as well as descriptive face-validity to both the syntax and the calculus dimensions of the language.
Given the critical role that a probabilistic language plays in determining both the low-level mechanics and the high-level ordinal ranking of the recommendations of an expert system, it is clear that the implicit rationality of the language is directly related to both the internal and external validities of computer based expertise. By •rationality' we refer here to the normative criteria of consistency and Complete ness (e.g. de Finatti, Savage [15] ), as well as the psychometric criteria of Reliability and Validity [Wallsten, 2l] . we argue that the performance of any expert, whether a human being or a computer program, should be evaluated and rated along those lines.
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The two mainstream probabilistic languages in AI are the no�ative Subjective 3ayesian school and the Certainty Factors (CF) ·�ovement,' the latter being representative of a wide variety of descriptive calculi of uncertainty. It seems that the CF method is currently the most widely used probabilistic lang uage in applied expert systems, primarily due to the popularity of such CF-based shells as EMYCIN, M.l and Texas Instrument's Personal Consultant. Bayesian inference has been traditionally much less popular, with the exception of some notable examples, e.g. PROSPECTOR [7] .
Recently, new heuristic techniques designed to cope with the computational complexity of a complete Bayesian design are emerging, giving rise to the neo-Bayesian concept of heuristic 'Bayesian inference nets' [Pearl, l3] .
Notwithstanding the critical importance of exploring the rational boundaries of expert systems, few studies have compared the CF and Bayesian languages on rational as wall as cognitive grounds. Furthermore, there exist a number of commonly held misconceptions regarding the state of the art of AI based belief representation techniques, such as the following two conjectures:
Cl:
Classical Bayesian methods are either too simplistic or too complex: in order for a Bayesian updating procedure to be computationally feasible, strict statistical independence must prevail. This requirement is rarely mat in practice, where interaction effects among clues and hypotheses make the Bayesian solution unmanageable on combinatorial grounds.
The CF calculus, on the other hand, does not explicitly require that the facts/hypotheses space be statistically independent, and hence can be used to modal realistically complicated problems that defy a normative Bayesian interpretation.
C2:
Both the Bayesian and the CF calculi are special cases of the general Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence [10] . Hence, they should be construed as two alternative and competing probabilistic languages, each specialized to deal with a particular class of problems and probabilistic designs.
Toward the end of the paper we will suggest a new and rather surprising interpretation of both Cl and C2.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents an axiomatic description of the notion 'domain of expertise.' Section 3 repeats the original probabilistic interpretation of CF's, as given by Shortliffe and Buchanan in (19] . Section 4 presents three lemmas that are further integrated into the CF-Bayesian Endomorphism Theorem (all proofs, along with two additional lemmas, may be found in [16] , which is available from the author).
sections 5 and 6 discuss the implications of the [19] . At the same time, unlike the ad-hoc nature or some or those contributions, the normative premise of this very general and domain-independent theorem requires no mora than the standard savagajda
Finetti axioms or subjective probability (15] .
The contribution of the CF-Bayesian Endomorphism 
DEFINITIONS
Let s be an n+l propositional space (X 0 ,x1, ••. ,X n l defined over the sat {ralse,unknown,true) n+l ,
Namely,
x i �h for soma o < i < n, and x i -e j ror j�i. Without loss of generality, we assume that i•O.
A subjective instantiation X • { h,e1, ..
• ,e n l of s may be characterized by two conditioning& of BEL, namely BEL(hie1, ••• ,e n ) and BEL(e 1, ••• ,e n lhl, termed the predictive solution and the diagnostic structure of X, respectively. a X is a problem in S if l. X is a subjective instantiation of s.
2. X has a diagnostic structure and a (possibly unknown) predictive solution.
• The Domain gf Exparti$4 V: 
Shortliffa & Buchanan have also suggested a syntactical mapping from Bayesian probabilities to certainty Factors, defined as follows:
we term the (Rl)-(R2) mapping a rational interpreta � for three reasons. First, the mapping is intended to convey a certain degree of descriptive face-validity to the CF language.
Second, it relates CF's to a subset of the real interval In the ��ctorial illustration of the t�eorem, v is an holistic problem that is outside the rational scope of the CF language (e.g. v • (h, a, b} has a synergistic diagnostic structure, i.e. SEL(a,blh) > BEL(alh)*BEL(blh)).
At the same time, however, v does have a (complicated) Bayesian solution, by virtue of its membership in v. This dichotomy means that one cannot trade rationality for efficiency, as is sometimes being done in AI. Furthermore, the likelihood that a real-life problem exists in wo is very small, due to the underlying complexity of problems that require expertise [5] .
The preceding paragraph implies that most CF-based expert systems (hence, most applied expert systems)
are inconsistent with their classical rational interpretation (Rl)-(R2). This finding is disturbing, because there exist reported instances where CF-based expert systems have achieved an impressive decision-making performance (8] .
There may be (at least) two potential explanations for the disparity between the narrow normative foundation and the de-facto face-validity ot the CF language.
First, I argue that experienced Knowledge Engineers intuitively ��ow that the CF-Bayesian Endomorphism
Theorem is true, and, in tact, take advantage ot it. In particular, designers ot complicated expert systems often teal that the more granular the knowledge-base, the higher is the validity ot the system (2] .
In the context ot the present theory, this heuristic amounts to augmenting an evidence 1 hypotheses inference net with a multitude ot sub hypotheses and intermediate states, designed to partition the knowledge-base and achieve a higher degree ot granularity. This judicious decomposition is done in an attempt to explicitly account tor interaction effects, and, thereby, induce more conditional independence on the evidence 1 hypotheses space ( [5] , [13] , (16] , (22] ).
In the context ot the present theory, we can describe this practice as followe: when a CF knowledge engineer faces an holistic problem v which is outside the scope ot a rational interpretation, he or she first modifies the diagnostic structure ot the original problem, thus creating a transformation trom v to dE WD, which is a rational CF territory. It there exists a problem d whose diagnostic structure is indeed a plausible (weak) decomposition ot v, a CF-based system applied to d is likely to provide a (close) r a tional belief representation to v as well.
The second explanation ot the CF descriptive 1 norm ative contrast may be that the original rational interpretation ot Certainty Factors (Rl)-(R2) is subject to doubt, as was also noted by Heckerman [12] .
In other words, it seems that the notion ot CF's is indeed a novel idea that deserves a serious look, especially on practical and descriptive groun ds.
Indeed, the tact that the CF movement has been going strong tor more than a decade in spite ot its unrealistically narrow rational interpretation sugg ests that the model is basically powerful although its normative foundation is weak. Hence, future basic research is needed to explore new interpreta tions to the CF language that will be more plausible on rational, cognitive, and philosophical grounds.
Coniecture Cl Revisited We now turn to the casual conjecture Cl, which attributes the impracticality of the Bayesian approach vis a vis the CF language to the fact that real life domains ot expertise are not statistically independent. This statement, in my view, is based on a semantic rather than a substantive arqument.
In particular, I have suggested elsewhere that statistical independence is not directly expressible in the CF formalism (16] . This is consistent with Shafer & TVersky, who observe that some mathematical properties are not translatable from one probabilistic language to another [18] .
However, the tact that a particular characteristic ot the world cannot be described in a certain language does not necessarily imply that this characteristic in nonexistent.
Tha statistical independence phenomenon is an attribute ot natura which stands aloot !rom the CF/Bayesian debate.
To clarity this distinction, we may use an analogy trom physics. The presence or absence ot statistical independence is a unique property ot a domain ot expertise just as the mass is a unique physical property of a brick. Notwithstanding tha mass uniqueness, the weight ot ' the brick varies with different scales (or on different planets) • Thus an absolute unique property ot natura may be mapped onto ditterent manifestations under dittarent circumstances.
Similarly, the manifestation ot the independence property may be explicit in soma probabilistic languages and vague or even null in others.
The crispness ot this expression should be construed as a property ot the language, not a property of nature.
coniecture ca Revisited The C2 conjecture suggests that both the CF and the Bayesian languages are special cases ot the Dempster-Shatar Theory ot Evidence. Although this premise is indeed correct, this truth is quite dittarent trom its popular interpretation.
That the Bayesian desiqn is a spacial case of the Dempster-shatar modal is a trivial corollary that can be found in (19] . Similarly, Gordon ' Shortlitte gave a Shafarian baliet interpretation to the CF calculus.
They than procaadad to conclude that In short, our analysis indicates that within the subset wo, CF's are remarkably Bayesian after all.
Outside the subset wo, the CF language may have a variety of free-fo� and appealing descriptive interpretations.
At the same time, those ad-hoc interpretations will not be accountable or testable on rational grounds, if only for the reason that a rational CF interpretation currently does not exist outside we.
of course, this restriction may be lifted if the orig inal interpretation (Rl)-(R2) is modified or extended in order to cover a larger superset of we. Furthermore, it is felt that the typical TSP const raint designed to avoid a sub-tour among k<n cities can be mapped onto the IP constraint that given that X is holistic, the computation of BEL cannot afford to disregard a dependency ot degree k within .. ,a n ) in the objective funct ion .
we now return to the implications of the CF-Sayesian
Endomorphism rheorem on knowledge engineering in light of the proposition just presented.
In particular, we wish to focus on the key question that we ought to address, namely:
how can a rule-based expert system compute the predictive solution of an holistic problem.
Basically, there seem to be three alternative options:
1. Apply a rule-based algorithm as though the problem in not holistic:
2. Devise a new, non rule-based holistic algorithm: hoped that this approach will strike a balance between preserving the intuitive element of human expertise, and, at the same time, entorcinq a certain degree ot normative rationality.
